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The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded
Number of Blocks∗
La´szlo´ A´. Ko´czy†
Abstract
We show the existence of an upper bound for the number of blocks
required to get from one imputation to another provided that accessibility
holds. The bound depends only on the number of players in the TU game
considered. For the class of games with non-empty cores this means that
the core can be reached via a bounded sequence of blocks.
JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C73, C61.
1 Introduction
An international agreement will only be signed if no country or group of coun-
tries can do better without it. However, the mere potential for such an agree-
ment does not make it signed. If an initial proposal is more favourable to some,
then those countries will not “give in” even if this leads to no agreement; in
an election having played hard can easily compensate for an unsigned agree-
ment where blaming other negotiating partners is certainly an easy and hardly
refutable explanation. International organisations, such as the UN can be a
catalyst by facilitating negotiations. Such an organisation is seen as a player
that gets a positive payoff only if an agreement is signed. While it cannot make
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rors are of course all mine. I also thank the Catholic University of Leuven and the Netherlands
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countries accept less than what they hope to get (under the status quo), it can
facilitate the formation of a coalition that blocks the current proposal and makes
another one, (temporarily) weakening the bargaining position of the problem-
atic countries thereby making them more inclined to sign an agreement. This
way a series of blocks to various proposals can eventually lead to the desired
agreement.
Given the existence of a signable agreement, is it possible to manipulate
negotiations so that it is actually signed? If yes, can we set deadlines to the
negotiations? The first question has already been answered affirmatively [10, 5].
The present paper answers the second: we show that one can set deadlines and
thereby estimate the expected costs of the process already before the negotia-
tions begin.
The core collects agreements that, once proposed, are never abandoned.
The question is whether such agreements will ever be proposed. Based on a
similar programme by Stearns [12] and Billera [1] for the bargaining set and
the kernel, Green [4] and Wu [14] present transfer schemes that converge to the
core. Perry and Reny [6] and Serrano and Vohra [11] defines noncooperative
bargaining games that implement core imputations as noncooperative strategy-
proof subgame-perfect equilibria. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis [2, 3] study
extensive form implementations of the private core and other solution concepts.
Here we take a cooperative approach and use the very same idea that is used to
define the core: blocking. Suppose an initial non-core imputation is proposed.
Then there exists a sequence of proposals and counter-proposals that eventually
leads to the core [10]. Sengupta & Sengupta [10], however, do not discuss the
number of steps required.
Let us illustrate the issue in question by the following 3-player coalitional
game where the grand coalition obtains 3, pairs get 2, singletons get 0. The core
of this game consists of a single payoff-vector (1, 1, 1). Now let ak =
(
1
k , 2− 1k , 1
)
and bk =
(
1
k , 1, 2− 1k
)
, consider an arbitrary positive m ∈ N, and the following
–unnecessarily lengthy– process:
am → bm−1 → am−2 → bm−3 → · · · → b1 = a1 = (1, 1, 1).
This process terminates in the core in exactly m−1 steps. As m is arbitrary the
number of steps to reach the core via such a path has no upper bound. The aim
2
(0,0,3)
(3,0,0)
(0,3,0)
r(1,1,1)
r rr rr rr rr rr rr rr rr rr
Figure 1: A finite, but unbounded sequence of dominance
of this paper is to show that the core can be reached in a bounded number of
steps, moreover, our proof points out where do such inefficient processes make
unnecessary detours.
Our result is not specific to the core. We show that if an imputation b can be
reached from another imputation a via a path of imputations, then the length of
the shortest of such paths is bounded. Since a player would never cooperate to
get less than he could by himself, it is realistic to allow only paths via efficient
and individually rational allocations, that is, via imputations. Without these
restrictions, as in [9] the proof is subject to simplifications.
The structure of the paper is as follows: First we introduce our notation and
some terminology. In Section 3 we state our results. The proofs are presented
in the Appendices.
2 Preliminaries
Let (N, v) be a TU-game with player set N , and characteristic function v.
Subsets of N are coalitions and v(S) is the payoff for coalition S ⊆ N . For any
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pair of vectors x, y ∈ RN and set S ⊆ N let x(S) =∑i∈S xi. The restriction of
x to S is denoted by xS ; we write xS ≥ yS if xi ≥ yi for each i ∈ S, we write
xS > yS if xS ≥ yS , but xS 6= yS . We denote the vector of stand alone values
by v∗, thus v∗(S) =
∑
i∈S v({i}). For each coalition S let S¯ = N \ S denote its
complementary coalition. Moreover, for the coalition Q let v¯(Q) = v(N)− v(Q¯)
denote its complementary value, that is, the total payoff left over for the players
outside Q¯. Note that the complementary value of coalition S is not the value
of the complementary coalition S¯.1
A payoff-vector x in RN is an imputation if x ≥ v∗ and x(N) = v(N): if it
is individually rational and efficient. Let A(N, v) denote the set of imputations.
Imputation y directly dominates x via coalition S, written y ÂSD x if yS >
xS and y(S) = v(S). Then we refer to S as the blocking coalition, and the
entire action of obtaining y from x is a block.2 The core collects undominated
imputations.
Alternative notions of dominance permit y(S) < v(S). Clearly our results
will hold if we make dominance a denser relation. Our choice is, however due
to our interpretation of dominance. The alternative definition merely compares
imputations and is satisfied with the preference for y against x, but it does not
investigate whether such a transition would actually take place. Our definition
is driven by blocks: If a coalition is wants to and can get a higher payoff, it will
–myopically– collect the maximum it can get.
We say that y indirectly dominates x and we write y ÂI x if there exists a
finite sequence of imputations
{
x0, . . . , xT
}
and a finite collection of coalitions{
S1, . . . , ST
}
, such that x = x0, y = xT , and xt ÂStD xt−1 for all 0 < t ≤ T . We
call the sequence pi = {(xt, St)}Tt=1 a (dominance) path, and T its length. The
index t is interpreted as time. For convenience we will index paths from 0, and
assume that S0 = N .
In this paper we study such dominance paths and interpret them as pro-
1For instance, in cohesive games we have v(S¯) ≤ v¯(S).
2The existence of imputation x and coalition S such that v(S) > x(S) do not not generally
imply the existence of an imputation y such that y ÂSD x. If v(S) + v∗(S¯) > v(N) such a y
would not be both individually rational and efficient for S. Since cohesiveness, or even super-
additivity are standard assumptions for pure cooperative games, moreover, for our Theorem
we consider games with nonempty cores, such a problem cannot arise.
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cesses. The path starts with an initial imputation x0. If there exists a coalition
S1, such that v(S1) > x0(S1) then the coalition S1 makes a threat of leaving the
grand coalition N , thereby collecting v(S1). Due to cohesiveness the remaining
players (weakly) prefer to renegotiate and accept a new imputation x1, where
the demand of coalition S1 is satisfied and therefore x1(S1) = v(S1), moreover
x1 directly dominates x0 via S1. Now x1 becomes the status quo, and so on,
as long as there exists a coalition who can do better apart than in the current
proposal. If no coalition can do better alone, then the imputation belongs to
the core.
The existence of a bound is linked to the existence of primitive recursive
algorithms: A primitive recursive algorithm is one that can be programmed
with “for” loops only [13] and the running time of such a program can be set in
advance. See [8] and [7] for more on primitive recursive algorithms.
3 Results
Lemma 3.1. For any given game (N, v) there exists an upper bound M , such
that for all a, b pairs in A(N, v) with b ÂI a there exist a dominance path pi from
a to b with length smaller than M .
The proof of Lemma 3.1 is presented in Appendix 4.
Lemma 3.2 (Theorem in [10]). Let (N, v) be a game with a non-empty core
C(N, v). Let a be an imputation outside C(N, v). Then there exists an imputa-
tion c ∈ C(N, v) such that c ÂI a.
Theorem 3.3. Let (N, v) be a game with a non-empty core C(N, v). Then
there exists an integer M such that for all imputations a ∈ A(N, v) there exists
an imputation c ∈ C(N, v) and a path pi from a to c with length smaller than
M .
Proof. For imputations a in C(N, v) the path pi is trivial. Otherwise the com-
bination of Lemmata 3.1 and 3.2 gives the desired result.
Lemma 3.4. Let a and b be imputations in A(N, v) with b ÂI a. Then there
exists a primitive recursive algorithm that defines a path pi = {(xt, St)}Tt=1 such
that x1 ÂS1D a, for 1 < t ≤ T we have xt ÂS
t
D x
t−1, and xT = b.
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Finally we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.5. Let (N, v) be a game with a non-empty core C(N, v). Let a be
an imputation in A(N, v). Then we show that there exists a primitive recursive
algorithm that defines a path pi = {(xt, St)}Tt=1 such that x1 ÂS
1
D a, for 1 < t ≤ T
we have xt ÂStD xt−1, and xT ∈ C(N, v).
The proofs of Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 3.5 are presented in the Appendices B
and C.
4 Discussion
The present paper continues the programme initiated by Green [4] and Wu [14]
by establishing a bound on the number of steps needed to reach the core. There
are, however some questions that are left open. In this paper our emphasis was
on the simplicity of the results rather than on the efficiency of the algorithms.
The existence of a bound is encouraging, but it is very likely that the bound
can be lowered. While boundedness allows us to define primitive recursive al-
gorithms for the intermediator to design the negotiation process, much lower
bounds are required to make the algorithms practical.
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Appendix A Proof of Lemma 3.1
A.1 Outline
The proof is by contradiction. We assume that for any number M0 there exist
imputations a and b such that b ÂI a, but the shortest dominance path from
a to b is pi = {(xt, St)}Tt=0 and T > M0. We show that if M0 ≥ M there exist
imputations xT1 and xT2 along the path pi that are so similar that the subpath
from xT1 to xT2 is essentially a loop that can be removed.
In case xT1 = xT2 we are done, but in general we have to find a path from xT1
to b. Note that two imputations are not necessarily connected by a dominance
path, but the similarity of xT1 and xT2 and the existence of a dominance path
from xT2 to b makes it possible to adapt it. Let pi′3 = {(yt, Qt)}T
′
t=0 denote
the adapted path. We choose Qt = ST2+t and so T ′ = T − T2. Given the
blocking coalitions we must define yt such that (i) they are imputations, that
is, individually rational and efficient, (ii) the resulting path is a dominance path,
(iii) pi′3 indeed ends at b. In the following we give an intuition of how we define
the imputations yt. A formal presentation will follow in Section A.5.2.
Knowing that coalition Q blocks x still leaves us some freedom in choosing
the resulting imputation y. We only have the following restrictions:
• Players must have at least their stand-alone value, y ≥ v∗.
• Blocking players must get at least as much as before, yQ > xQ.
• The total payoff must be efficient y(N) = v(N).
• The payoff for the blocking coalition Q must be efficient, y(Q) = v(Q).
The first two conditions define what we call the subsistence payoff : the bare
minimum that has to be distributed. Typically the last two conditions mean
that there is more to be distributed. Part of this is distributed within the
blocking coalition, and some among the remaining players, that is, the comple-
mentary coalition. In distributing this extra we consider future blocks: we give
no or minimal extra payoff to those in the the next blocking coalition to fur-
ther motivate their block. Since the payoff of the players in the complementary
coalition Q¯ is independent of their previous payoff, they, in essence, lose all they
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had, including any potential extra payment they had received. Thus, by giving
the extra payments to those who do not block in the next round we can waste
some payoff that could be inhibitive in later rounds. The problematic cases oc-
cur when the entire blocking or complementary coalition blocks, and becomes a
faction or cofaction (see Definitions A.1 and A.2) of the next blocking coalition.
Then there is no way to get rid of the extra payments. Such cases require special
attention. It is comforting though that the (total) payoffs for (co)factions are
the same in the adapted as in the original path. It is also true that as soon as
such a faction (or at least part of it) is not blocking, the extra payoff can be
wasted. Still, most of the definition of similarity is about ensuring that blocks
are preserved even if such factions form.
A.2 Example
We illustrate our proof by a simple example with players and a symmetric char-
acteristic function where the payoff of a singleton, a pair, a triple and the grand
coalition is 0, 0.4, 0.7 and 1, respectively. The core of this game is non-empty.
We consider the randomly generated path in Table 1 that starts from imputa-
tion (0.925, 0.025, 0.025, 0.025) and leads to imputation (0.142, 0.3, 0.274, 0.284)
that belongs to the core.
After this introduction we can move on to the formal definitions.
A.3 Definitions
The proof requires a number of additional definitions. Let a and b be imputa-
tions such that there exists a path pi = {(xt, St)}Tt=0 leading from a to b. As
before, xt are the imputations, St are the blocking coalitions. S0 plays no role,
but for completeness we let S0 = N . The length T is finite; we associate t with
time.
Definition A.1 (Faction). If a non-trivial blocking coalition becomes a lasting
blocking alliance we refer to it as a faction. Formally, for a given path pi we say
that F is a faction at time τ if F = Sτ0 for some 0 < τ0 < τ and F ⊆ St for
all τ0 < t ≤ τ , or briefly
F =
τ⋂
t=τ0
St = Sτ0 . (A.1)
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t xt St Gt
0 (0.925, 0.025, 0.025, 0.025) ∅
1 (0.032, 0.374, 0.026, 0.568) {2, 3} ∅
2 (0.08, 0.3, 0.03, 0.59) {1, 3, 4} ∅
3 (0.28, 0.582, 0.12, 0.018) {1, 3} ∅
4 (0.111, 0.489, 0.341, 0.059) {3, 4} ∅
5 (0.265, 0.373, 0.227, 0.135) {1, 4} ∅
6 (0.141, 0.459, 0.262, 0.138) {3, 4} ∅
7 (0.212, 0.3, 0.316, 0.172) {1, 3, 4} ∅
8 (0.213, 0.184, 0.416, 0.187) {1, 4} ∅
9 (0.215, 0.185, 0.423, 0.177) {1, 2} ∅
10 (0.329, 0.194, 0.3, 0.177) {1, 2, 4} ∅
11 (0.535, 0.218, 0.065, 0.182) {2, 4} ∅
12 (0.3, 0.342, 0.092, 0.266) {2, 3, 4} ∅
13 (0.304, 0.347, 0.096, 0.253) {1, 2} ∅
14 (0.3, 0.348, 0.097, 0.255) {2, 3, 4} ∅
15 (0.303, 0.214, 0.097, 0.386) {1, 3} ∅
16 (0.3, 0.216, 0.097, 0.387) {2, 3, 4} ∅
17 (0.379, 0.224, 0.097, 0.3) {1, 2, 3} ∅
18 (0.04, 0.56, 0.099, 0.301) {3, 4} ∅
19 (0.13, 0.557, 0.27, 0.043) {1, 3} ∅
20 (0.156, 0.444, 0.319, 0.081) {3, 4} ∅
21 (0.171, 0.447, 0.3, 0.082) {1, 2, 4} ∅
22 (0.085, 0.515, 0.303, 0.097) {3, 4} ∅
23 (0.095, 0.282, 0.305, 0.318) {1, 3} ∅
24 (0.098, 0.283, 0.3, 0.319) {1, 3} {1}
25 (0.104, 0.296, 0.392, 0.208) {1, 2, 4} {1, 4}
26 (0.121, 0.357, 0.243, 0.279) {1, 2} {1, 3, 4}
27 (0.142, 0.3, 0.274, 0.284) {1, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4}
Table 1: Example: payoffs, blocking coalitions and gaining players along a path.
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If a faction contains smaller factions, we consider the largest one.
Definition A.2 (Cofaction). Similarly, if the entire complementary coalition
blocks we call it a cofaction. Formally, for a given path pi we say that C is
a cofaction at time τ if C = S¯τ0 for some 0 < τ0 < τ and C ⊆ St for all
τ0 < t ≤ τ .
There exists at most one faction, while there may be several cofactions. A
blocking or complementary coalition becomes a (co)faction if the coalition is a
subset of the next and possibly of subsequent blocking coalitions. Instead of a
one-time alliance these players stick together for a longer period and participate
in a row of blocks together. Right before becoming a (co)faction C had a
total payoff of v(C) (or v¯(C) for cofactions) and in the subsequent blocks this
total payoff may increase, but cannot decrease. Therefore a (co)faction C must
have a total payoff of at least v(C) (or v¯(C) respectively) making a separate
treatment necessary. Note that a faction and/or possible cofactions are defined
with reference to a period τ and typically a set of players will not constitute a
(co)faction at τ ′ > τ .
Our example illustrates both very well: At τ = 7, F = {3, 4} is a faction: it
is a blocking coalition at τ = 6 and has been a subset of the blocking coalition
“ever since”. A more complex example were necessary to show how factions
can build up and dissolve. Step τ = 2 illustrates a cofaction. Since S1 = {2, 3}
and its complement blocks in period 2, that is, S2 ⊇ C = S¯1 = {1, 4}, the
coalition C is a cofaction. Note that both the faction and the cofaction preserve
the payoffs players have even if it is more than necessary, for the faction this
is simply the coalitional payoff, for the cofaction it is the complementary value
v¯(C) = 1− 0.4 = 0.6.
Definition A.3 (Weakest players). Those players in S ⊆ N are the weakest,
denoted by W t(S), who are the first not to block, while others in S block. For-
mally: If there exists a finite τ > t such that S * Sτ then let τ∗ be the minimal
such τ and W t(S) = S \ Sτ∗ , otherwise (they are always blocking) W t(S) = S.
If S is the blocking coalition, the weakest players are the “weakest link” in
it: in the example at t = 9 and for S = {1, 2} the weakest link is {1} as 1 will
block only until t = 10, while 2 blocks until t = 14.
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If S is a complementary coalition the weakest players are those that do not
block in the next step. If such players do not exist, a cofaction is formed, and
the weakest players are those dropping out first. We see this at t = 1 with
S = {1, 4} or at t = 20 with S = {1, 2}. While W 1({1, 4}) = {4}, we have
W 20({1, 2}) = {1, 2}, that is, players in S may be equally weak.
Definition A.4 (Subsistence level). Given a dominance path pi = {(xt, St)}Tt=0
we define the subsistence level st ∈ RN for all t > 0 as the vector of minimal
payoffs that allows xt to be individually rational and that makes the block St
profitable. Therefore:
sti =
x
t−1
i if i ∈ St
v({i}) otherwise.
Definition A.5 (Surplus vector). For given z ∈ R, S ⊆ N and time t let
Dt(S, z) ⊆ RN denote the set of vectors d > 0 with d(N) = d(W t(S)) = z, that
is, vectors d that share z among the weakest players. Surplus vectors are then
the elements of D˜t(S, z) = argmind∈Dt(S,z)maxi {bi − (sti + di)} . Let d˜t(S, z) ∈
D˜t(S, z).
The set D˜t(S, z) is well defined, in fact d˜t(S, z) is unique.3 The surplus
vector reduces the “distance” from the final imputation b while making sure
that gaining players (see Definition A.8) never exceed their final payoff. It will
be used to allocate extra gains beyond the subsistence level and hence the name.
Definition A.6 (Concatenation). If pi1 = {(xt1, St1)}T1t=0 and pi2 = {(xt2, St2)}T2t=0
are paths such that x02 = x
T1
1 , we can define their concatenation as
pi1 ∧ pi2 =
{
(x01, S
0
1), (x
1
1, S
1
1), . . . , (x
T1
1 , S
T1
1 ), (x
1
2, S
1
2), . . . , (x
T2
2 , S
T2
2 )
}
.
A.4 Defining the bound M
We define a classification of imputations. The number of classes is M , that is
to be the upper bound in Lemma 3.1.
3We can construct d˜t(S, z) as follows: Per definition d˜t(S, z)i = 0 if i is not among the
weakest players in S. So we focus on the weakest players in S. Distribute z gradually,
always increasing d˜t(S, z)i, where i maximises bi− (sti + d˜t(S, z)i). Clearly, this decreases the
maximum and bring us closer to the minimum. When z is consumed we are done.
12
Definition A.7 (Similar imputations). Imputations x and y are similar if for
all quadruples of mutually disjoint coalitions QF , QC , QS and QI with QF ∪
QC ∪QS ∪QI = Q ( N and QI 6= ∅, and all partitions QC of QC we have
v(QF ) +
∑
C∈QC
v¯(C) + v∗(QS) + x(QI) ≥ v(Q) if and only if
v(QF ) +
∑
C∈QC
v¯(C) + v∗(QS) + y(QI) ≥ v(Q). (A.2)
Similar imputations are safe against the same blocks (that is QF = QC =
QS = ∅), even after certain modifications, where the initial differences are
limited to a subset of the players. While the particular construction will be
understood in Proposition A.10 the motivation is clear: if coalition QF has
its coalitional payoff, all coalitions C ∈ QC have their complementary value,
players in QS their individually rational value instead of the original payoff,
then imputations x and y must still neither or both be dominated via coalition
Q.
In our example x3 and x19 are similar. In order to establish similarity one
has to check all, in this case a total of 47 different conditions. For instance,
consider Q = {1, 2}, such that 1 ∈ QC and 2 ∈ QI . Then the condition becomes
v¯({1}) + x2 ≥ v({1, 2}) if and only if v¯({1}) + y2 ≥ v({1, 2}). This condition
states that if there is a path from x, such that at period τ the coalition {1, 2}
blocks, moreover, player 1 constitutes a cofaction and player 2 has a history of
continuous blocking from the start, then there is a path from y, where coalition
{1, 2} also blocks, and vice versa.
Now consider a path pi = {(xt, St)}Tt=0. Let Gt =
⋃T
τ=t+1 S
τ denote the
set of gaining players: players who are sure not to lose, but only to gain in
the remaining τ > t part of the path. Such players require special attention
as along the modified path their payoff can only be increased, but not lowered.
Observe that the set of gaining players monotonically increases, and within one
path there are n + 1 possible different sets, with Gt = N only possible when
t = T .
Definition A.8. Imputations that are similar and have the same set of gaining
players belong to the same class.
Note that having the a certain set of gaining players is a path dependent
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property, however the number of pigeon-holes needed is the same for all paths.
Since Equation A.2 really creates partitions of N we have a finite number of
classes. Let M denote this number. If the number of imputations in pi exceeds
M we are guaranteed to find T1 < T2 such that the imputations xT1 and xT2
are similar.
In practice even relatively short paths, such as our example will already have
similar imputations. As we have already mentioned, in our example x3 and x19
are similar, moreover they have the same (empty) set of gaining players and
therefore they belong to the same class.
A.5 Creating a shorter path
Let a, b ∈ A(N, v) be such that b ÂD a and pi = {(xt, St)}Tt=0 be a shortest path
from a to b. Assume that pi has a length exceeding M . We construct a shorter
path by modifying it: we seek two similar imputations xT1 and xT2 , remove the
subpath pi2 connecting them, modify the tail pi3 to get pi′3 and reattach it to the
head pi1. The resulting path pi′ = pi1 ∧ pi′3 is shorter than pi, giving the desired
contradiction.
s
x0
-
S1 s
x1
-
S2 s
x2
s
xT1︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi1
s
xT2︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi2
s
xT−1
-
ST s
xT︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi3
W ²s
x0
-
S1 s
x1
-
S2 s
x2
s
xT1 = (xT2)′︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi1
s
(xT−1)′
-
ST s
xT︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi′3︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi′=pi1∧pi′3
Figure 2: Schematic picture of the proof.
A.5.1 Trisection of path pi
As a first step in defining the new path we look for similar imputations along pi.
By the assumption that T > M such imputations exist. Let us denote them by
xT1 and xT2 . The imputations xT1 and xT2 cut pi into 3 subpaths pi1, pi2, and
pi3 so that pi = pi1 ∧ pi2 ∧ pi3.
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A.5.2 A similar path: pi′3
Our aim is to find the path pi′3 from x
T1 to b. While two imputations need not
be connected by a dominance path in general, the existence of a dominance path
from xT2 to b and the similarity of xT1 and xT2 makes the definition possible in
this case. We make use of a particular construction that uses the same sequence
of blocks.
In order to avoid cumbersome notation we write Qt instead of (ST2+t)′ =
ST2+t and yt instead of
(
xT2+t
)′ for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T −T2. Therefore the new path
is pi′3 = {(yt, Qt)}T
′
t=0, where T
′ = T − T2.
Then we define path pi′3 = {(yt, Qt)}T
′
t=0 by
Qt = ST2+t and yt =
x
T1 if t = 0 and
st + δt + ²t for 0 < t ≤ T ′,
(A.3)
where st is the subsistence payoff and δt and ²t are the surplus vectors
δt = d˜t(St, v(St)− st(St)) and (A.4)
²t = d˜t(S¯t, v¯(S¯t)− st(S¯t)). (A.5)
What remains is to show that pi′3 is a dominance path from x
T1 to xT .
A.6 An example
Let us first apply our method to our example.
We have already found that imputations x3 and x19 are similar and there-
fore they can be used to create a shorter path. This shorter path consists of
x0, x1, x2, x3 and a modified versions of x20, . . . , x27 as defined by Equation A.3:
we use the same sequence of blocking coalitions. These determine the weakest
players in each blocking coalition as well as in its complement. Since the fu-
ture of each of the players is typically different, the set of weakest players is
mostly a set containing a single element: the surplus vectors assign the surplus
to this player and then finding the next imputation is straightforward. To this
only mputations y1, y2 and y7 are exceptions. In the first two we see players 1
and 2 forming a cofaction for a single round and then be blocked by 3 and 4.
As a result the distribution of the complementary payoff is actually irrelevant.
Imputation y7 is more interesting: all blocking players age gaining players and
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t yt QtF Q
t
C Q
t
S Q
t
I
(0.925, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)
(0.32, 0.374, 0.26, 0.568)
(0.08, 0.3, 0.030, 0.590)
0 (0.280, 0.582, 0.120, 0.018)
1 (0.221, 0.379, 0.382, 0.018) ∅ ∅ ∅ {3, 4}
2 (0.262, 0.42, 0.3, 0.018) ∅ {1, 2} ∅ {4}
3 (0 , 0.6, 0.3) 0.1) ∅ {3} ∅ {4}
4 (0 , 0 , 0.4, 0.6) ∅ {3} {1} ∅
5 (0 , 0 , 0.3, 0.7) ∅ {2, 4} {1} ∅
6 (0 , 0.4, 0.6, 0.) ∅ ∅ {1, 2} ∅
7 (0.129, 0.6, 0 , 0.271) ∅ ∅ {1, 4} ∅
8 (0.142, 0.3, 0.274, 0.284) {1, 4} ∅ {3} ∅
Table 2: The (shorter) path generated by the algorithm. Boldface indicates
blocking coalitions Qt. The right hand side refers to Proposition A.10 on page
17.
so there will be no further chance to decrease their payoffs. The definition of
surplus vectors, however ensures that no payoff runs over.
Our example also illustrates how easy it actually is to generate a similar
path that ‘works’.
A.6.1 The path pi′3 is a dominance path
We show that the path pi′3 generated in Subsection A.5.2 is a dominance path
from xT1 to xT . To do so we show that
• All elements of pi′3 are imputations (Proposition A.9).
• The path is a dominance path, that is, an imputation is directly dominated
by the next imputation (Propositions A.10, A.11, and A.12).
• Finally we need to check that the path is indeed from xT1 to xT . While
the first holds per definition, the second requires an additional result,
Proposition A.13.
All propositions, except the last one will be shown by induction over t.
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Proposition A.9. If 0 ≤ t ≤ T ′, the vector yt is an imputation.
The second proposition is about the anatomy of a blocking coalition.
Proposition A.10. If 0 ≤ t < T ′ the blocking coalition Qt+1 partitions into:
QF Players belonging to a faction.
QC Players belonging to a cofaction.
QS Players whose fellow members from their last complementary coalition have
some been non-blocking since then.
QI Players who never belonged to the complementary coalition.
Moreover, players i in QS have yti = v({i}), players j in QI their original payoff
ytj = y
0
j .
Proposition A.11. If 0 ≤ t ≤ T ′ the block by Qt+1 is profitable: v(Qt+1) >
yt(Qt+1).
Proposition A.12. If 0 < t ≤ T ′ the imputation yt directly dominates yt−1
by coalition Qt, that is yt ÂQtD yt−1.
Proposition A.13. The imputations yT
′
and xT = b coincide.
The two less intuitive results are Propositions A.10 and A.13. While the
latter is, as we will see, a result of certain properties of the surplus vector we
illustrate the first by our example.
A blocking coalition will contain a faction if it contains the previous blocking
coalition (which, itself, is then a faction), as in y8. It will contain a cofaction if
it contains the entire complementary coalition as in y2, y3 or y5. These can also
survive ‘nested’ in a larger faction: in y4 the blocking coalition contains player
3 that constitutes a cofaction since y2. A player belongs to QS if it comes with
a fraction of the complementary coalition, possibly via a cofaction. An example
of the latter is player 2 in y6: it is a fraction of the complementary coalition
Q¯4. Finally, player 4 belongs to QI for a while as it has a winning streak since
the original payoff. Note that if players 3 and 4 would belong to the blocking
coalition after yt, they would belong to QF as they would have a surplus they
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have to carry. If, after that, only one of them, say 4 would be blocking then 4
would again belong to QI , while 3 would never again.
Now we proceed to the proof itself.
Step 1. Trivial case, t = 0.
Proposition A.9. Since xT1 is an imputation y0 is also an imputation.
Proposition A.10. Trivially all i ∈ Q1 satisfy i ∈ QI .
Proposition A.11. Since y0 = xT1 and xT2 are similar, and v(Q1) > xT2(Q1),
the block by Q1 is profitable, that is, v(Q1) > y0(Q1).
Proposition A.12 is an empty statement here.
Step 2. Inductive assumption.
We assume that for each 0 < τ < t the imputation yτ has already been defined,
and we have shown that Propositions A.9, A.10, A.11 and A.12 hold.
Step 3. Inductive step.
Proposition A.9. By Proposition A.9 for yt−1, by the definition of subsistence
levels and since δt > 0, ²t > 0 the vector yt is individually rational. By construc-
tion yt(N) = st(N) + δt(N) + ²t(N) = v(N) so efficiency is also satisfied.
Proposition A.10. We consider 3 cases4 based on the type of the block Qt+1.
1. Qt ⊆ Qt+1. Then Qt is a faction and hence QF = Qt. Since Qt+1 6= N ,
Q¯t 6⊂ Qt+1. Then for each i ∈ Q¯t ∩ Qt+1 we have sti = v({i}) and
δti = ²
t
i = 0, since i /∈ Qt, and i /∈ W t(Q¯t). Thus yti = v({i}) and
QS = Qt+1 \Qt.
See also t = 7 in the example: there Q8F = {1, 4} and Q8S = {3}.
2. Q¯t ⊆ Qt+1. Then Q¯t acts as a cofaction and hence Q¯t ⊆ QC . As Qt+1 6=
N and Qt 6⊂ Qt+1 we cannot have Qt as a faction. For each i ∈ Qt+1 \ Q¯t
by definition we have sti = y
t−1
i , moreover δ
t
i = ²
t
i = 0 since i /∈ Q¯t and
i /∈W t(Qt): thus yti = yt−1i .
We apply the inductive assumption for players in Qt.
4The fourth case, Qt ⊆ Qt+1 and Q¯t ⊆ Qt+1 would imply N ⊆ Qt+1 and hence N = Qt+1,
which does not make sense
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(a) Players in QtS∩Qt+1 with their initial or individually rational payoffs
belong to Qt+1S as well.
(b) With the exception of Q¯t, cofactions in Qt+1C are part of QC .
(c) If there is a faction that survives it becomes set QF .
(d) The interesting players are those that are members of a faction or
a cofaction that just broke up. In either case, by construction, any
surplus gained was given to the weakest players that are not in Qt+1.
Hence, in the latter case players have their stand alone payoff and
belong to QS . In the former case we get the pre-deviation payoffs
of players participating in an earlier deviation. By the induction hy-
pothesis Proposition A.11 holds for this coalition as well, and we can
repeat our arguments. As a blocking coalition must, by definition,
strictly contain any possible (co)faction, we gradually assign all play-
ers to one of the sets except potentially a set QI of players that are
winning from the start, but, by construction, these have their initial
payoffs.
3. Finally we consider the case when Qt * Qt+1 and Q¯t * Qt+1. First let
i ∈ Q¯t ∩ Qt+1. By the same argument as in Case 1, we have yti = v({i})
and (Qt+1 \Qt) ⊆ QS . Now let j ∈ Qt ∩Qt+1. By the same argument as
in Case 2, ytj = y
t−1
j and since j ∈ Qt, Proposition A.10 for yt−1 implies
it for yt.
Proposition A.11. We use the notation of Proposition A.10.
Let us partition players in Qt+1 according to Proposition A.10. We have
yt(Qt+1) = v(QF ) +
∑
C∈QC
v¯(C) + v∗(QS) + y0(QI), (A.6)
where QC is the collection of cofactions in QC . Note that QC and/or QS may
be empty.
Now consider the corresponding payoffs in path pi. The players are involved
in blocks by the same coalitions and hence the same partition of Qt+1 forms.
However, in this “organic” path extra payoffs are distributed in an uncontrolled
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way so that the payoffs of not only the weakest players can increase. Therefore
players in the sets QF , QI , QS and QC can collect (but not lose!) additional
payoff in addition to the payoffs characteristic for the group. Since the block by
St+T2 = Qt is profitable
v(Qt+1) > xt+T2(Qt+1) ≥ v(QF ) +
∑
C∈QC
v¯(C) + v∗(QS) + xT2(QI). (A.7)
Since xT2 and y0 = xT1 are similar, Equations A.6 and A.7 imply v(Qt+1) >
yt(Qt+1).
Now assume that Qt+1 does not contain players who have their initial payoffs
at t, but possibly a composite player. This modifies Equation A.6 as follows:
yt(Qt+1) =
∑
C∈RC
v¯(C) + v∗(RS) + v(RO). (A.8)
As before, in the other path blocks can lead to gains, hence:
v(Qt+1) > xt3(Q
t+1) ≥
∑
C∈RC
v¯(C) + v∗(RS) + v(RO). (A.9)
Combining this equation with Equation A.8 we get v(Qt+1) > yt(Qt+1) as
required.
Proposition A.12. For i ∈ Qt the subsistence level sti = yt−1i already guarantees
the level of pre-block payoffs. By the weaker Proposition A.11 for yt−1 blocks
are profitable and so the equaliser function δt shares a strictly positive amount,
δt(Qt) > 0 among the members of Qt and, per construction, δti ≥ 0. Since
²ti = 0, we conclude y
t
Qt = s
t
Qt + δ
t
Qt + ²
t
Qt > y
t
Qt .
Proposition A.13. What remains to prove is that the newly constructed path
not only starts, but also arrives at the right imputation.
Due to the particular construction of pi′3, the payoff for players who are not
dominating is defined without reference to their previous payoffs. Hence a player
may accumulate however high payoff, it will also lose it unless it belongs to the
gaining set.
Now we use the fact that xT1 and xT2 were selected in part because they
have the same gaining sets, GT1 = GT2 of players so that xT1i ≤ xT2i for all
i ∈ GT1 . The definition of surplus vectors ensures that they are always the
weakest players who get the profit of the deviation, and these are typically not
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the gaining players. However, if the gaining players are also the weakest (they
are clearly the “strongest”, but the two may coincide) the payoff equalising
vectors ensure that none of the gaining players is assigned a payoff higher than
the respective payoff in b = xT . Since GT
′−1 = N , by efficiency they must also
receive exactly the payoff at b.
Appendix B Proof of Lemma 3.4
Sengupta and Sengupta [10] define a dominance path from any outcome to the
core, but since their algorithm is not primitive recursive their result can be used
here but to the extent of existence. In Section A.5.2 we have constructed a
path of length at most M relying only on the sequence of blocking coalitions.
Since the number of coalitions is finite, so is the number of possible sequences
of length at most M . Then our algorithm can be defined as follows.
1. Generate all coalition sequences {Qt}Ty=1 of length at most M .
2. For all such blocking sequences do the following loop:
(a) Attempt to generate {yt}Ty=1 using Equation A.3.
(b) If generation is successful then per construction it is a bounded se-
quential domination path. Exit loop.
(c) Take the next blocking sequence.
3. Stop.
Since a ÂI b, by Lemma 3.1 there exists a path pi′3 =
{
(y˜t, Q˜t)
}T ′
y=1
. The
algorithm goes through all coalition sequences including
{
Q˜t
}T ′
y=1
so it finds it,
unless it finds another suitable sequence and terminates sooner. The algorithm
is primitive recursive by construction.
Appendix C Proof of Theorem 3.5
We begin by the following lemma.
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Lemma C.14. Let a ∈ A(N, v), c ∈ C(N, v) and {Qt}Tt=1 a sequence of coali-
tions. Then there exists a dominance path {(yt, Qt)}Tt=0 from a to c if and only
if
1. for all i ∈ ⋂Tt=1Qt we have bi ≥ ci,
2. v(QT ) = c(QT ), moreover
3. if ∃ 0 < t < T such that Q¯t ⊆ Qt′ for all t′ > t then c(Qt) = v(Qt).
Proof. The if-part holds by the construction of {yt}Tt=0 as given in Section A.5.2.
For the only-if part we assume that the whole dominance path is generated and
yT = b. For those in the complementary coalition Q¯T the latter is granted per
definition of ²T
′
. We focus on the players in the last blocking coalition QT .
Property Bt in the proof of Lemma 3.1 partitioned the members of QT into
four sets.
• If i ∈ QS then yT−1i = v({i}). Since c is an imputation ci ≥ yT−1i must
hold.
• QF obtained a payoff of v(QF ) when it was blocking and has since then
only increased its payoff. However c(S) ≥ v(S) holds for all coalitions S.
• For QC we require c(QC) ≥ yT−1(QC) ≥ v¯(Q¯C). On the other hand,
since c is a core imputation c(Q¯C) ≥ v(Q¯C) so c(QC) ≤ v¯(Q¯C). Hence
c(QC) = v¯(Q¯C) or alternatively c(Q¯C) = v(Q¯C). Since QC = Q¯t for some
t such that Q¯t ⊆ Qt′ for all t′ > t, we must have c(Qt) = v(Qt).
• Finally we consider QI that contains players with their initial payoffs y0i .
Such players have a winning streak from the beginning to the end so their
payoff monotone increases. Hence for all such i the relation ai ≤ ci must
hold.
So we conclude that all conditions of Lemma C.14 are necessary for profitable
blocks along {(yt, Qt)}Tt=0.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. If we knew the core imputation c that is accessible from
a then we could simply use Lemma 3.4 to prove the theorem. But not only that
we do not know such a c, but there are in general a continuum of imputations in
22
C(N, v) all of which are potential candidates, so checking all of them one-by-one
is not an option. However given a and a sequence {Qt}Tt=1 of blocking coalitions,
Lemma C.14 enables us to define the –possibly empty– accessible subset of core
Ca
(
N, v, {Qt}Tt=1
)
⊆ C(N, v) satisfying the conditions of Lemma C.14. By this
lemma for any c′ ∈ Ca
(
N, v, {Qt}Tt=1
)
we can generate a sequence {yt}Tt=1 of
the required type. By Theorem 3.3 there exists a
{
Q˜t
}T∗
t=1
, such that the set
Ca
(
N, v,
{
Q˜t
}T∗
t=1
)
is not empty, since there exists c∗ ∈ Ca
(
N, v,
{
Q˜t
}T∗
t=1
)
.
Then our algorithm is as follows:
1. Generate all coalition sequences of length at most M .
2. For all sequences of blocking coalitions {Qt}Ty=1 do the following loop:
(a) Generate the set Ca = Ca
(
N, v, {Qt}Tt=1
)
.
(b) If Ca is not empty exit loop.
(c) Take the next sequence.
3. Generate {yt}Tt=1.
4. Stop.
By Lemmata 3.4 and C.14 the algorithm terminates and produces a path
with the required properties. By construction the algorithm is primitive recur-
sive.
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